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The past decade has seen the conclusion of a series of bilateral security pacts between 
the liberal democratic states of the Asia Pacific region.  These agreements, between 
countries including the United States, Australia, Japan and India, have been treated 
with suspicion by the Chinese government, as evidence of a policy of ‘neo-
containment’ led by the US.  The common thread that runs through the rationale for 
each of the agreements is the notion of ‘shared values’ amongst the signatory nations, 
always referring to human rights, democracy, and open markets.  In this context, this 
paper seeks to investigate the possibility that these liberal values are being used to 
drive a wedge between the US and its allies and China, effectively establishing a quasi 
‘league of democracies’ that has been advocated by some neo-conservatives and 
liberal hawks in the US.  The analysis of these developments has both practical and 
theoretical significance.  First, are the Chinese right to be concerned about these 
developments and do they represent a Cold War-style policy of containment guided 
by the US?  Second, if the security agreements are intended in this way, what does 
this tell us about the influence of liberalism in contemporary international politics?  
Utilising the tools of discourse theory, this paper argues that the security agreements 
illustrate the problematic place of liberal democratic values in international politics 




* * * 
 
Introduction 
What is the place of liberal values in the development of regional or global security 
networks?  Or, to put it another way, to what extent does a national identity based on 
liberal values promote or inhibit the realisation of regional or global security?  
Answers to these questions will, of course, vary according to the lens through which 
we view international relations.  Realists will tend to dismiss the importance of 
‘shared values’ in their analysis of power relations between sovereign states, or may 
suggest that an excess of such values will lead to the destabilisation of international 
politics and the onset of crusading, imperialist behaviour.1  Liberal internationalists, 
on the other hand, will insist that shared liberal-democratic values provide the only 
sustainable basis for the realisation of world peace.  These values-based communities, 
furthermore, will not impinge upon the pursuit of the individual interests of nation-
states, given the intersections between the interests in peace and prosperity held by all 
                                                 
1 The classical Realist statement to this effect can be found in Morgenthau’s fifth principle of political 
Realism: Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Brief ed. 
(Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 1993), 13..  More recently, the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy 
restated these Realist concerns in the context of the Iraq war and what they saw as the overzealous 
moralism of the Bush administration: The Perils of Empire, (Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 
2004 [cited 18 October 2008]); available from http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/static/000027.php. 





peoples everywhere around the globe.2  It is around these two dominant schools of 
thought that debates in international relations have tended to coalesce since the 
emergence of what has become know as the ‘first debate’ in international relations in 
the late 1930s and 1940s.  While many embraced the notion of liberal victory 
following the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War,3 the 
liberal/realist debate was reignited in the context of the war on terror, with argument 
and counter-argument over the place of ‘universal values’ taking centre stage.  The re-
emergence of this debate stemmed in large part from what many people saw as an 
excessive insistence upon the promotion of liberal-democratic values by the Bush and 
Blair administrations which led to engagement in conflicts (particularly in Iraq) which 
were contrary to the national interest and unsettling for international order in general.4   
Beyond the central foci of the war on terror, the insistence on ‘shared values’ 
as the foundation stone for effective security arrangements reached a new high-point 
over this period.  While moves toward this ‘value oriented diplomacy’5 had developed 
most clearly in the 1990s, it was with the Bush administration, guided by the ‘moral 
clarity’6 of the neo-conservatives and the ‘millennial’7 task of winning the war on 
terror, that the repeated articulation of these values began to impact upon relations 
between the United States and China.  It is the task of this paper to assess these 
developments and to gain a fuller understanding of the place of liberal values within 
them.   
My method in approaching this question is to analyse the political discourses 
that surrounded the development of the bilateral and multilateral security agreements 
concluded amongst liberal democratic states over the past decade.  This approach 
encourages an understanding of the links between representations of the world and the 
development or maintenance of power.  In particular, it sheds light on the terms of 
inclusion and exclusion that reside within the texts of international politics.  In this 
context, the questions that I will seek to address will include: How did the notion of 
‘shared values’ influence the formation of an Asia-Pacific security community over 
the past decade?  How did those implicitly or explicitly excluded from this 
community – particularly China – react to these developments?  In what ways was the 
development of an overtly liberal-democratic alliance linked to broader theoretical 
and political discourses over this period?  Finally, what were the dangers or problems 
                                                 
2 Clear formulations along these lines are present in the security and foreign policy doctrines of most 
liberal democratic states.  See, for example, Tony Blair, The Doctrine of the International Community 
(Institute of International Affairs, Saint Petersburg, 1999 [cited 27th November 2003]); available from 
http://data.cirp.info/intervention/blair-chicago.html; 'The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America',  (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002). 
3 The key text in this regard is, of course, Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 
(New York: The Free Press, 1992). 
4 The Perils of Empire. 
5 This is the term employed by former Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro Aso, in support of his moves 
toward creating an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’, which will be discussed further below.  See 
'Diplomatic Blue Book 2007',  (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007); Speech by Mr. 
Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs 
Seminar ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons’, (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007 [cited 1 September 2009]); available from 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html. 
6 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs 75, no. 
4 (1996): 27. 
7 Tony Smith, A Pact with the Devil: Washington's Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the 






in the formation of this alliance and how might this be related to the apparent 
diminution of references to shared values in more recent regional security politics? 
 
 
‘Value Oriented Diplomacy’ in Asia-Pacific Alliances 
 
Writing in 1998, Mike Mochizuki and Michael O’Hanlon called for the realisation of 
a ‘liberal vision for the US-Japanese alliance.’  Driven by the need for a more activist 
Japan in global military affairs, they argued that what was needed was ‘a major effort 
from Washington and Tokyo to strengthen their alliance, not against a military threat 
but in the name of common interests and values.’8  Such an approach would, 
according to Mochizuki and O’Hanlon, help to defuse concern both within Japan and 
in the wider region about any expansion of Japanese military activity; smooth the way 
for ‘joint [US-Japan] responses to humanitarian tragedies’; allow Japanese 
participation in military activities that ‘advance liberal objectives’; and provide ‘the 
basis for gradually extending security commitments to a broader community of 
nations.’  Perhaps most importantly, the argument was made that the intensification of 
a values-based alliance with Japan would provide ‘a better guide to relations with 
China.’9  The hierarchical language used in making this point is striking, as 
Mochizuki and O’Hanlon contend that Japan and the US could ‘tell China that, if it 
continues to evolve into a democratic state that ensures civilian control of the military 
and agrees not to resolve disagreements by force, it could and should be part of a 
regional collective-security arrangement with them.’10 
 Implicitly drawing upon the democratic peace literature, the confidence that 
Mochizuki and O’Hanlon place in the notion of shared values is based upon the claim 
that collective security mechanisms amongst liberal democratic states ‘are the most 
reliable mechanisms available for keeping the peace.’11  The shared values are 
valuable, therefore, precisely because they allow the US and Japan to advance their 
own (liberal democratic) self-interests as well as providing a springboard for the 
realisation of a peaceful world.  The final claim that is made in the article is that ‘the 
liberal pillar of the [US-Japan] alliance is weak’ and that ‘it is time to strengthen it 
and make it real.’12   
The question that arises at this point is: what does it mean to ‘realise’ an 
alliance built on strong shared values?  From the perspective of discourse theory, the 
‘real’ is embedded in our representations of the world, in the collection of words and 
symbols that generate meaning through classification and hierarchisation.  It makes 
sense, from this perspective, to analyse the justifications and explanations that were 
offered by political leaders from the late 1990s onwards as to why certain security 
arrangements were being put in place.  In the remainder of this section I will, to this 
end, explore the ‘web’13 of security pacts that has developed over the past two 
                                                 
8 M. Mochizuki and M. O'Hanlon, 'A Liberal Vision for the U.S.-Japanese Alliance', Survival: Global 
Politics and Strategy 40, no. 2 (1998): 127. 
9 Ibid.: 128. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.: 132. 
12 Ibid.: 134. 
13 The notion of security webs is employed as a substitute for the more prevalent idea of ‘hubs and 
spokes’.  The aim is to downplay the idea that the US is at the centre of such security arrangements, 
sending the message that their alliance partners have equal status and that more is expected of them in 





decades between the United States, Japan, Australia and India.  The first part will be 
devoted to analysis of the various bilateral agreements and the second will look at the 
moves toward multilateral security partnerships between the four nations.  In each 
example I will highlight the centrality of ‘shared values’ of liberal democracy in the 
text of the agreements themselves as well as in the interviews and media releases that 
surrounded them.  This, I will argue, indicates that the liberal vision proffered by 
Mochizuki and O’Hanlon was in fact ‘realised’ over the decade that followed the 
publication of their article, but perhaps not with the positive consequences that they 
foresaw. 
 It must be stressed at this point that the discussion to follow will focus on the 
predominant themes of shared values as they have been expressed since the end of the 
Cold War.  The pace and extent of political change in the countries under analysis is 
such that any definitive declarations on the future of their foreign policies remains 
impossible.  The changes in leadership from Bush to Obama in the US, from Howard 
to Rudd in Australia and from Aso to Hatoyama in Japan may have dramatic impacts 
on the future relations between their respective nations.  This, however, does not 
nullify the value of this study, which aims to assess the antagonistic dimensions of 
liberal-democratic values in international politics.  Indeed, the fact that we have seen a 
move away from ‘values-oriented diplomacy’ in the past two to three years may 
indicate a shift in Asia-Pacific hegemony in favour of China, a point I will return to 
later in the paper. 
 
Bilateral Agreements between the US, Japan, Australia and India 
It is widely accepted that the alliance with Japan forms ‘the bedrock of American 
strategy in East Asia’14 as it has done since the end of WWII.  In the context of the 
Cold War and increasingly in the decades that have followed, this alliance has been 
grounded, at least rhetorically, in the existence of shared liberal-democratic values.  
The contemporary articulation of these values was, of course, implanted and fostered 
by the United States following the defeat of Imperial Japan in WWII and the 
subsequent occupation under General McArthur, during which the Japanese 
Constitution was formulated.  As Tadashi Iwami and myself have argued elsewhere,15 
the erosion of the pacifist clause contained in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution 
has been closely associated with the American acceptance of Japan as a trustworthy 
liberal-democratic partner, a development which raises questions about the pacifying 
effect of liberal values in international affairs.  While there is no scope for rehearsing 
the full extent of this argument in the context of this paper, it is necessary for the 
purposes of this paper to reiterate the persistence of shared values as the foundation 
for US-Japan relations in the 21st century. 
 Indeed, it may be said that Japan, particularly under Prime Ministers Koizumi, 
Abe and Aso, have been the most enthusiastic proponents of a values-based security 
arrangement with the United States and have worked as the core driver of the values 
                                                                                                                                            
promoting regional security.  For a discussion see Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr, 'From Wheels 
to Webs: Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements', Washington Quarterly 24, no. 1 (2001). 
14 G. John Ikenberry and A. M. Slaughter, 'Forging a World of Liberty under Law: U.S. National 
Security in the 21st Century',  (Princeton, NJ: The Princeton Project on National Security, 2006), 50.  
See also Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, 'The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 
2020',  (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 15. 
15 J Moses and T Iwami, 'From Pacifism to Militarisation: Liberal-Democratic Discourse and Japan's 






based security community in the Asia-Pacific.  Following a meeting between 
Junichiro Koizumi and George W. Bush on July 29, 2006, a joint statement was 
released that contained the subheading ‘The US-Japan Alliance Based on Universal 
Values and Common Interests’.  This section of the joint statement contained a clear 
example of the values/security linkage that is the subject of this paper, claiming that: 
 
The United States and Japan stand together not only against mutual threats but also 
for the advancement of core universal values such as freedom, human dignity and 
human rights, democracy, market economy, and rule of law. These values are deeply 
rooted in the long historic traditions of both countries. The United States and Japan 
share interests in: winning the war on terrorism; maintaining regional stability and 
prosperity; promoting free market ideals and institutions; upholding human rights; 
securing freedom of navigation and commerce, including sea lanes; and enhancing 
global energy security. It is these common values and common interests that form the 
basis for U.S.-Japan regional and global cooperation.16 
 
Further, this statement of shared values and interests was followed by the claim that 
the Asian continent as a whole was now undergoing a transformation in line with 
these universal values.  This, consequently, would be a transformation that would take 
place under the leadership of the US and Japan. Hence:  
 
Asia's historic transformation is underway, creating a region that increasingly 
embraces the universal values of democracy, freedom, human rights, market 
economy, and rule of law. The two leaders pledged to work together to shape and 
support this transformation. In this regard, the two nations will continue to work on 
common challenges in the region such as (a) promoting individual freedoms; (b) 
increasing transparency and confidence in the political, economic, and military fields; 
and (c) protecting human dignity, and resolving humanitarian and human rights 
problems including the abduction issue.17 
 
The rhetoric of liberal change and democracy promotion in the alliance between the 
US and Japan continued under the leadership of Shinzo Abe.  Indeed, Abe is credited 
by some as having pushed the constitutional reform agenda forward to a greater extent 
than any previous Japanese Prime Minister.  This led neo-conservative commentators 
Dan Blumenthal and Gary Schmitt to applaud Abe’s commitment to what they called 
a ‘liberal nationalism’ and give him credit for equating ‘Japan’s well-being with the 
spread of the universal values associated with liberal democracy and human rights’.18  
Following a meeting between Bush and Abe in Washington in November, 2006, Abe 
commented that: 
 
Japan and U.S. share an alliance which is based on fundamental values, such as 
freedom, democracy, basic human rights and the rule of law. And we agreed with 
each other that strengthening our alliance would be a good in maintaining peace and 
security of not just Japan and the region surrounding Japan, but the entire world.19 
                                                 
16 Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting: The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century, (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan, 2006 [cited 6 December 2008]); available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
america/us/summit0606.html. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Dan Blumenthal and Gary Schmitt, 'A Japan That Can Say Yes', The Weekly Standard 12, no. 4 
(2006): 12. 
19 President Bush Meets with Prime Minister Abe of Japan, (The White House, 2006 [cited 20 
November 2008]); available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061118-
2.html. 






 The 2007 ‘Armitage Report’, published by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, also places repeated emphasis on values as the foundation stone 
for US-Japan relations.20  Importantly, this report also uses this commonality of 
values as an explicit point of differentiation from China.  The possibility of a 
‘condominium between the United States and China’ as the ‘logical future [security] 
structure for the region’ is considered by the authors to be unlikely for ‘as long as the 
United States and China have different value systems.’21  The Armitage Report also 
makes a strong case for extending the regional alliance structure ‘based on 
partnerships with the United States and shared democratic values’ to other like-
minded states, including Australia, India and New Zealand.22   
Similar themes have underpinned the US-Australia alliance since the mid-
1990s.  Building upon the relatively ‘value-free’ ANZUS Treaty of 1951, government 
representatives of both countries have enthusiastically incorporated references to 
culture, values, and traditions in more recent statements and communiqués relevant to 
security in the Asia-Pacific.  In the ‘Sydney Statement’ of 1996, for example, the two 
countries committed themselves to joint action that would ‘contribute to the 
development of a regional security environment which promotes democracy, 
economic development and prosperity, and strategic stability.’23  This was followed in 
1998 by Madeline Albright’s statement of ‘unshakeable’ commitment to ‘the freedom 
and welfare’ of the Australian people; a commitment, she argued, that ‘is consistent 
with enduring principles of democracy and law.’24  The joint commitment to 
democracy promotion then reappeared in the communiqué following the Australia-US 
Ministerial (Ausmin) talks in 1999, in which ‘Australia and the United States affirmed 
that the spread of political and economic freedom, growth of democratic institutions, 
and respect for human rights’ are vital for ‘the achievement of genuine long-term 
stability and lasting peace’.25 
The notion that the US-Australian alliance is founded upon ‘shared values’ 
also found an expression in the 2000 Australian Defence White Paper and the 2003 
Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper.  Whilst acknowledging that the white papers 
emerge from different ministries which may embrace different vocabularies, there is a 
notable increase in the references to values between the 2000 and 200326 papers that 
can most obviously be explained by reference to the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks and the subsequent intensification of pro-liberal democratic discourses on the 
                                                 
20 Armitage and Nye, 'The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020'. 
21 Ibid., 14. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Sydney Statement: Joint Security Declaration: Australia-United States: A Strategic Partnership for 
the Twenty-First Century, (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1996 [cited 23 November 2008]); 
available from http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/us/ausmin/sydney_statement.html. 
24 Address by secretary of state madeleine k. albright to the australasia centre of the asia society, 
(Embassy of the United States (Australia), 1998 [cited 22 November 2008]); available from 
http://canberra.usembassy.gov/irc/us-oz/1998/07/30/address.html. 
25 Tony Blair, 'Broadcast to the Nation',  (London: BBC, 1999). 
26 There are around thirty distinct references  to Australia’s values – as well as an entire chapter 
devoted to ‘Projecting Australia and Its Values’ – in the 2003 White Paper, as opposed to five in the 
2000 paper. See 'Advancing the National Interest : Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper',  
(Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003); 'Defence 2000: Our Future Defence 
Force',  (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2000); 'Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: 






part of the United States and her allies.  The clearest statement of this and its meaning 
for the alliance can be found in the 2003 White Paper, with the declaration that: 
 
Australia and the United States share values and ideals that underpin our strong 
relationship.  We both have deep democratic traditions and aspirations, elements of a 
common heritage and a lasting record of cooperation and shared sacrifice.  Our 
security alliance is a practical manifestation of these shared values.27 
 
This location of the alliance within a framework of shared values was reiterated 
following the 2005 Ausmin consultation.28  Interestingly, however, the values 
language appears to have evaporated altogether in the 2009 Australian Defence White 
Paper, as the Rudd Government pursues a closer relationship with China, an issue to 
which I will return in the final section.  Suffice it to say at this point that US-
Australian security arrangements and the political statements surrounding them have 
dwelt, as Tow and Albinski argue, ‘on similar values, shared histories, languages and 
outlooks within the so-called Western community of states.’29 
 Values discourse is also evident at the heart of the security relationship 
between Australia and Japan.  In a joint statement to the press following the a meeting 
of Prime Ministers Howard and Koizumi in 2002, the ‘long-standing close ties and 
cooperation between Australia and Japan’ were recognised as being ‘based on their 
shared values of democracy, freedom, the rule of law and market-based economies.’30 
It was in the context of these cordial relations that increased military cooperation 
rapidly developed, reaching a peak with the signing of the formal  Joint Declaration 
on Security Cooperation in March, 2007.   Here again we find references to shared 
values underpinning the agreement as a whole, as the document affirms ‘that the 
strategic partnership between Japan and Australia is based on democratic values, a 
commitment to human rights, freedom and the rule of law, as well as shared security 
interests, mutual respect, trust and deep friendship’ and commits ‘to the continuing 
development of their strategic partnership to reflect shared values and interests.’31  
Statements following the subsequent meetings between the foreign and defence 
ministers of both countries (also know as the 2+2 meetings) have reinforced the claim 
that the alliance was founded upon ‘shared democratic values, common interests in 
peace and stability in the region, and respective alliance relationships with the United 
States.’32 
                                                 
27 'Advancing the National Interest : Australia's Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper', 86. 
28 Here, it was stated that ‘both sides emphatically affirmed the enduring significance and relevance 
of the alliance and its firm basis in shared values, interests and sacrifice.’ 2005 Australia-United 
States Ministerial Consultations Joint Communiqué, (Embassy of the United States (Australia), 2005 
[cited 29 November 2008]); available from http://canberra.usembassy.gov/irc/us-
oz/2005/11/18/communique.html. 
29 William Tow and Henry Albinski, 'Anzus-Alive and Well after Fifty Years', The Australian Journal 
of Politics and History 48, no. 2 (2002): 171. 
30 Joint Press Statement by Prime Minister John Howard and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi: 
‘Australia-Japan Creative Partnership’, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2002 [cited 18 
November 2008]); available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0204/joint.html. 
31 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
2007 [cited 12 December 2008]); available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/australia/joint0703.html. 
32 Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations Joint Statement 2007, 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007 [cited 12 December 2008]); available from 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0706.html. 





Finally, and briefly, it is worth addressing the US-India relationship, given the 
slightly different issues that it raises. In general, the language of shared values in 
dealings between the US and India mirrors almost exactly the examples I have already 
described. Former Director of Policy Planning for the Department of State, Richard 
Haass, argued in 2001, for example, that the US-India partnership was ‘not based on 
narrow self-interests but first and foremost on common values, on a shared 
understanding of right and wrong and a shared vision for a future world that is safer 
more prosperous, more democratic and more just’.33  Such an approach was 
reaffirmed in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States34 and a further 
speech by Haass in 2003.35 
What is unique about recent moves toward greater security cooperation 
between the United States and India, however, is the fact that shared democratic 
values are iterated as being of greater importance than any potential tension over 
India’s possession of nuclear weapons.  A 2003 deal to allow greater ease of weapons 
trade between the US and India had the effect, according to then-US Ambassador 
Robert Blackwill, of putting India ‘in the same category with American Treaty Allies 
such as…Japan’.36  The New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship, 
agreed in 2005, is also significant in this regard.  In this document, the ‘world’s two 
largest democracies’ agree to build more strategic partnership for ‘political and 
economic freedom, democratic institutions, the rule of law, security and opportunity 
around the world’, as their defence relationship ‘derives from a common belief in 
freedom, democracy and the rule of law.’ 37 
In response to critics of the 2007 US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
Initiative, which allows nuclear technology transfer between the two countries despite 
India’s possession and testing of nuclear weapons, the White House issued a press 
statement declaring that ‘it is not credible to compare the rogue regimes of North 
Korea and Iran to India. Unlike Iran or North Korea, India has been a peaceful and 
vibrant democracy with a strong nuclear non-proliferation record’.38  President Bush 
later expanded on this line of argument, claiming in 2008 that ‘nations that follow the 
path of democratic and responsible behavior will find a friend in the United States of 
America.’39  It is statements such as these that illustrate the different standards that are 
expected of states that are democratic as opposed to those that are not.  While there is 
not necessarily anything wrong with having different standards for different regime 
                                                 
33 Tow and Albinski, 'ANZUS-Alive and Well after Fifty Years': 172. 
34 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America'. 
35 Richard N. Haass, The United States and India: A Transformed Relationship (Remarks to the 
Confederation of Indian Industry, Hyderabad, India, January 7, 2003, 2003 [cited November 10, 
2008]); available from http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/16399.htm  
36 Robert D. Blackwill, 'Opinion', The Hindu, May 13, 2003. 
37 New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship, (Embassy of India, June 31 2005 [cited 15 
November 2008]); available from http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/June/31.htm.  In 
the joint press statement that followed the signing of this agreement, a similar wording appeared: ‘As 
leaders of nations committed to the values of human freedom, democracy and rule of law, the new 
relationship between the United States and India will promote stability, democracy, prosperity and 
peace throughout the world’. India-United States Joint Statement, (Embassy of India, 2005 [cited 19 
November 2008]); available from http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/July/21.htm. 
38 India Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Responding to Critics, (The White House, 2006 [cited 19 
November 2008]); available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/. 
39 President Bush Signs H.R. 7081, the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and 







types, what this illustrates is that the references to shared values are not just examples 
of rhetorical window-dressing, but in fact have real consequences in terms of 
determining the rules and norms of the international order.  In particular, attention 
must be paid to the fact that the values are being invoked in order to justify military 
cooperation and validate the joint exercise of force.  I will return to this issue below. 
It is clear, then, that in the bilateral security arrangements that have been 
agreed between the United States, Japan, Australia and India over the past decade, the 
place of values discourse is central.  I will now briefly turn to the related development 
of multilateral frameworks between the four countries to further illustrate the 
influence of ‘shared values’ as well as the hostile Chinese reaction to these 
developments. 
 
Multilateral agreements between the US, Japan, Australia and India 
Over the same period that saw the development of the bilateral security arrangements 
discussed above, moves were made to intensify cooperation along trilateral and 
quadrilateral lines.  These developments began with a 2001 agreement to hold 
trilateral security talks in 2002 at the vice-ministerial level, a move welcomed by then 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard40 and later by US Deputy Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage, who commented that ‘we are all democracies, we're all concerned 
with the fate of Asia and it seems to me a perfectly reasonable proposition that we 
ought to get together and talk...the United States is 100 per cent willing to take part.’41 
With regard to the strengthening of the Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) to 
ministerial level, John Howard claimed in 2005 that: 
 
 Today, the three great Pacific democracies – the US, Japan and Australia – are 
working more closely than ever on shared security challenges – especially terrorism 
and weapons proliferation. Our Trilateral Security Dialogue has added a new 
dimension to the value all sides place on alliance relationships.42 
 
The elevation of the TSD to ministerial level in 2006 illustrated the increasing 
importance with which it was viewed in Washington, Tokyo and Canberra.  The 
meeting of the group, held in Sydney in March, 2006, followed in the wake of 
comments by Condoleezza Rice suggesting that all allies in the Asia-Pacific region 
had a ‘responsibility’ to ensure that the rise of China would not be a ‘negative force’ 
in international politics.43  Again beginning with a reference to the democratic nature 
of the three parties, the joint statement released at the end of the discussions focused 
                                                 
40 Howard commented at the time that ‘We are both liberal democracies. We have cooperated very 
closely in the fight against terrorism. We see the security relationship between our two countries vis-à-
vis the United States as extremely important. And we again endorse the value of a trilateral security 
dialogue at a senior level, Vice-Minister, Foreign Minister-level, Foreign Affairs head-level rather, 
between Australia, Japan, and the United States.’ Opening Statements by Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi and Prime Minister John Howard of Australia at the Joint Press Conference, (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2002 [cited 10 December 2008]); available from 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0204/op_0501.html. 
41 'U.S. Deputy State Secretary Backs U.S.-Australia-Japan Security Talks',  (The British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2001). 
42 John Howard, The Lowy Lecture: Australia and the World (The Lowy Institute for International 
Affairs, 2005 [cited 17 June 2006]); available from 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=396. 
43 Purnendra Jain, A 'Little Nato' against China (Asia Times Online, 18 March 2006 [cited 20 
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mainly on cooperation in humanitarian, counter-terrorism and anti-proliferation 
initiatives, with a brief mention of China’s ‘constructive engagement in the region.’44 
The importance of the TSD took on sharper contours with the emergent 
Japanese commitment to ‘values oriented diplomacy’ and promotion of  ‘the arc of 
freedom and prosperity’ from late 2006.  In a speech to the Japanese Institute for 
International Affairs in December, 2006, then Foreign Minister Taro Aso argued that: 
 
I firmly believe that Japan must make its ties even firmer with friendly nations that 
share the common views and interests, namely of course the United States as well as 
Australia, India, and the member states of the EU and NATO, and at the same time 
work with these friends towards the expansion of this ‘arc of freedom and 
prosperity’.45 
 
‘This arc’ according to the 2007 Japanese Diplomatic Blue Book: 
 
would start from Northern Europe and traverse the Baltic states, Central and South 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Indian 
subcontinent, then cross Southeast Asia finally to reach Northeast Asia. Here, a 
region of stability and plenty with its basis in universal values – the Arc of Freedom 
and Prosperity – would take shape.46 
 
It was on these grounds that the Japanese Government enthusiastically embraced the 
TSD and courted the participation of India in an enlarged democratic grouping in the 
region.  To this end, a spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Minister announced at the 
TSD talks in 2007 that ‘India shares common interests – liberalism and democracy – 
with us’, as the reason behind Japan’s desire to see India included at future meetings. 
 From the US side, the publication of the 2007 Armitage Report, entitled 
Getting Asia Right, advocated increased cooperation ‘with Japan and other like-
minded countries to advance an agenda that supports democracy, rule of law, and 
modern norms for internal regime behavior.’47  More specifically, the report 
contended that: 
 
An open structure in which Japan, India, Australia, Singapore, and others are leading 
by example, based on partnerships with the United States and shared democratic 
values, is the most effective way to realize an agenda for Asia that emphasizes free 
markets, continued prosperity based on the rule of law, and increasing political 
freedom.48 
 
While many may question the place of Singapore amongst these ‘like-minded’ liberal 
democratic states, this approach went beyond mere discussions in late 2007 with the 
conduct of joint naval exercises amongst the five countries in waters off India.  The 
exclusion of China from these developments was also explicitly justified in the report, 
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based on the argument that the ‘values gap’ between the countries would necessarily 
lead to a ‘trust deficit’.   The lack of trust, it was argued, was made evident by China’s 
dealings with countries such as ‘Iran, Sudan, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Uzbekistan’, 
which appeared to allow for the continuation of ‘irresponsible’ behaviour on their 
behalf.49 
Values discourse has, therefore, been at the centre of moves toward 
multilateral security arrangements between the US, Japan, Australia and India.  These 
moves have, however, run up against Chinese resistance in a much more obvious way 
than the bilateral agreements discussed above.  As Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation correspondent Graham Dobell suggested in 2007, China ‘was unsettled 
enough by the new trilateral security dialogue’ but was ‘positively agitated by the idea 
that it could be transformed from three to four, with India joining up.’50  Prior to the 
first exploratory meeting of the four parties during the ASEAN Regional Forum in 
May, 2007, the Chinese government had sent diplomatic notes to each of the countries 
seeking clarification on the purpose of their discussions.51 In addition, despite a fairly 
muted response from higher levels of Government in China, D. S. Rajan has 
suggested that ‘the Party and State-controlled media in the country seem to be given a 
free hand to comment on the subject.’52  Citing Chinese-language media reports and 
commentary on the quadrilateral initiative (QI), Rajan suggests that: 
 
The Chinese analysts have come out with a firm rejection of the QI, alleging that it 
resurrected a cold-war mentality and is designed to deliberately divide Asia into two 
camps, based on social systems and ideology as well as to counter-balance the rising 
influence of China in the region... Any grouping without China [they argue], is 
ridiculous, irresponsible and impractical and marks formation of a small NATO to 
resist China.53 
  
In response to Chinese concerns, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer downplayed the significance of the talks and argued that the relationship 
between Australia, the US and Japan was ‘a very natural relationship, a very natural 
thing for Australia’ that ‘shouldn't be interpreted as an act of conspiracy against 
China.’54  Later, John Howard remarked, using similar language, that: 
It's natural that we should relate to each other through the prism of that common 
practice of democracy… That's not anti-Chinese... the trilateral security dialogue is in 
no way anti-Chinese, that is just a complete furphy.55 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 4. 
50 Graeme Dobell, Correspondents Report  - China Concerned by 'Alliance of Democracies' (ABC 
Online, 24 June, 2007 2007 [cited 15 August 2009]); available from 
http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2007/s1959831.htm.  
51 Frank Ching, 'Asian Arc of Democracy', Korea Times, 24 February 2008; Dobell, Correspondents 
Report  - China Concerned by 'Alliance of Democracies' ; D. S. Rajan, China: Media Fears over India 
Becoming Part of Western Alliance  (South Asia Analysis Group, 2007 [cited 15 July 2009]); available 
from http://www.saag.org/common/uploaded_files/paper2350.html. 
52 Rajan, China: Media Fears over India Becoming Part of Western Alliance. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Downer Downplays Talks' China Focus, (ABC News, 28 March, 2006 2006 [cited 11 December 
2008]); available from http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2006/03/18/1595073.htm. 
55 Howard Denies Trilateral Talks 'Anti-Chinese', (ABC News, 2006 [cited 11 December 2008]); 
available from http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/09/09/2027960.htm. 





In September, 2007, announcing a massive new deal for the provision of natural gas 
from Australia to China, John Howard claimed that the TSD between the United 
States, Japan, and Australia was ‘not directed at anyone’.56 The question remains, 
then, as to why ‘shared values’ need to come in to the picture at all.  If, indeed, this 
‘web’ of security relations is purely concerned with counter-terrorism, 
humanitarianism, non-proliferation and disaster relief, why should China not be 
involved at the highest levels?  It is at this point that it becomes useful to turn away 
from diplomatic relations between the states in question and turn instead to an 
analysis of the intellectual currents, particularly in the US, that ran in tandem with the 
centralising of liberal-democratic values in Asia-Pacific security debates.   
 
A Concert (or League) of Democracies? 
 
Regardless of the intentions of the four parties, the equation of the TSD (and the 
efforts to include India) with a ‘democratic alliance’ immediately draws attention to 
the academic literature and politics surrounding the idea of a ‘Concert of 
Democracies’, an idea which gained some influential advocates in the 1990s and 
found its most formal expression in the final report of the Princeton Project on 
National Security (PPNS).57  In combining the analysis of the Asia-Pacific security 
pacts founded upon shared values with an analysis of the academic literature on the 
possibility or desirability of a concert or league of democracies, I aim to generate a 
deeper appreciation of the potential concerns that might arise in non-democratic 
societies when such values-based alliances are mooted. 
The idea of a broad alliance of democratic states gained traction in the context 
of Russian and Chinese opposition to proposed humanitarian interventions in the 
1990s.  Emblematic in this regard is the work of Geoffrey Robertson, who, in his 
1999 book Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, railed against 
what he saw as the obstructionist veto of Russia and China, which was stultifying 
efforts to promote humanitarian ‘justice’ through the exercise of military force under 
the auspices of the United Nations Security Council.  In this vein, Robertson argued 
that: 
 
The radical possibility occurs that human rights might have a healthier future if it 
parted company with the United Nations, if that body were replaced or marginalized 
by a democratic ‘coalition of the willing’: an organization comprising only countries 
which are prepared to guarantee fundamental freedoms through representative 
government, independent national courts and by pledging to support an independent 
international justice system… Might it now be worth constituting a world 
government of ‘parliamentary peoples’ which would safeguard human rights by 
being premised upon them, a kind of global NATO, no longer lumbered with 
backward or barbaric states.58 
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This type of argument, influenced heavily by the democratic peace literature of the 
1980s and 1990s, foresaw the formation of a ‘separate peace’ amongst liberal states as 
being the necessary foundation for a more activist approach to the promotion of 
human rights and democracy, through military force if necessary.59 
 Importantly, such proposals did not wither in the face of the unilateralist 
tendencies of the Bush administration, but rather reached a peak around the same 
period that the abovementioned security pacts were being put in place.  In the Final 
Report of the PPNS, entitled Forging a World of Liberty Under Law, the authors write 
that: 
 
While pushing for reform of the United Nations and other major global institutions, 
the united States should work with its friends and allies to develop a global ‘Concert 
of Democracies’ – a new institution designed to strengthen security cooperation 
among the world’s liberal democracies. This Concert would institutionalize and ratify 
the ‘democratic peace.’ If the United Nations cannot be reformed, the Concert would 
provide an alternative forum for liberal democracies to authorize collective action, 
including the use of force, by a supermajority vote.60 
 
Such a proposal indicates the scope and power of ‘democratic league’ thinking in the 
period between 2005-2008.  In specific relation to China, the PPNS report suggests 
that uncertainty over China’s future intentions gives weight to the idea of 
strengthening ‘ties with democratic allies in the region’ on a bilateral and multilateral 
level.61  In an appendix to the report, from the ‘Working Group on Grand Strategic 
Choices’ co-chaired by John Ikenberry and Francis Fukuyama, it is proposed that 
strategies of inclusion and exclusion are adopted ‘simultaneously’ in order to ‘hedge 
against an aggressive China.’62  These proposals are interesting insofar as they seek to 
deny full international agency to a power as large as China and indeed speak as if the 
Chinese are deaf to the implications of the proposals.   
 This logic finds expression in an even clearer form in an article published by 
Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay in 2007, entitled ‘Democracies of the World Unite.’  
In making their case for a Concert of Democracies that could circumvent the Russian 
and Chinese vetoes on the UNSC, Daalder and Lindsay offer three key tasks for the 
democratic bloc:  ‘First, the Concert would be a vehicle for helping democracies 
confront their mutual security challenges… Second, the Concert would promote 
economic growth and development… Third, the Concert would promote democracy 
and human rights.’63  While the setting of these tasks is perhaps unsurprising, what is 
noteworthy is the very close correlation between these goals and the explicit aims of 
the various security arrangements I have discussed above.  This gives further weight 
to the claim that the conclusion of these agreements had much in common with the 
agenda for a ‘Concert of Democracies’, a point which would surely not have gone 
                                                 
59 For an example of this approach, see Fernando R. Tesón, 'The Kantian Theory of International Law', 
Columbia Law Review 92, no. 53 (1992); Fernando R. Tesón, 'The Liberal Case for Humanitarian 
Intervention', in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, ed. J Holzgrefe 
and R. O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
60 Slaughter and Ikenberry, 'Forging a World of Liberty under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st 
Century', 7. 
61 Ibid., 49. 
62 Ibid., 63. 
63 Ivo H. Daalder and James Lindsay, 'Democracies of the World Unite', Public Policy Research 14, no. 
1 (2007): 55. 





unnoticed in Beijing and Moscow.  Indeed, Daalder and Lindsay explicitly single out 
Russia and China as being the ‘foremost defenders’ of a principle of ‘absolute 
sovereignty’ that is ‘unsustainable in an age of global politics.’64  From their 
perspective, it is only democratic states, sharing a common dedication to ‘the life, 
liberty, and happiness of free peoples’,65 who can effectively recognise and deal with 
contemporary threats to humanity. 
 A final point of note surrounding the idea of the Concert is the support it has 
received from influential neoconservative figures Robert Kagan and Charles 
Krauthammer.  For his part, Krauthammer, responding to John McCain’s campaign 
proposal to establish a league of democracies in early 2008 – enthusiastically 
endorsed the idea, celebrating what he sees as its ‘hidden agenda’ which ‘is 
essentially to kill the UN.’66  Kagan has been particularly prolific on the subject and 
has not been shy about presenting such a league as a direct opponent to an ‘League of 
Dictators’ led by China and Russia.67  As Will Hutton suggested in his review of 
Kagan’s book The Return of History and the End of Dreams, this division into 
separate alliances would result in the formation of two distinct, opposing blocs: 
 
One, centred on the Shanghai Co-operation Council, would be the authoritarian states 
of China, Russia and others; the second, under US leadership, would be the European 
and American democracies, Australasia, Japan and India. Instead of struggling for 
unachievable UN resolutions blocked by the authoritarians, the democracies would 
be free to go head to head in ideological and political competition.68 
  
The appeal of this kind of Manichaean division of world politics for neoconservatives 
has been evident for many years and has been the subject of intense criticism.69  What 
is perhaps most fascinating about it, however, is the conjunction that it represents 
between liberal internationalist and neo-conservative thought within the US foreign 
policy establishment.70  In this regard, proposals for a ‘Concert of Democracy’ must 
be taken seriously as being representative of a powerful bipartisan current in US 
politics.  Having sketched the contours of these ideas, I can now turn to a discourse 
theoretical critique of both the references to shared values in Asia-Pacific security 
pacts and the theoretical arguments about a Concert of Democracies with which they 
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Liberal Antagonism in Asia-Pacific Security 
 
In critiquing the advocates of a democratic alliance, Gideon Rachman has argued that 
‘the formation of a league of democracies would harden antagonisms and might even 
be seen as the launching of a new cold war.’71  Whilst this is an argument which could 
be made from a realist position, critical discourse theory enables a ‘deeper’ critique 
that addresses the hidden dangers of an alliance based on ‘shared values’ but does not 
then insist upon a return to ‘prudent self-interest’ as the only possible response.  In 
undertaking this analysis, I will examine the problems of universality, hierarchy, 
legitimacy and the relation of these to the use of force. 
 From a discourse theoretical perspective the concern is not with the very 
existence of an antagonism between liberal and non-liberal – as every social group is 
necessarily premised upon some form of antagonistic relation with outsiders – but 
rather the representation of the ‘shared values’ as universally applicable.  Drawing 
upon the Enlightenment metaphysics of Kant and his understanding of a humanity 
united by reason, the conclusion is drawn that liberal democratic politics and the 
associated principles of human rights are right and good for all people in all places 
and in all times.72  The danger of such universal values is that – despite the inherent 
denial – they cannot be anything other than contingent.  If the goal of spreading 
universal values was to be universally achieved, the notion of a liberal-democratic 
security community would cease to have any value as a justification.  ‘Shared values’ 
only matter, therefore, as a point of differentiation.  They gain their value, meaning 
and substance through differentiation from those who do not share the values in 
question.   
The use of shared values and the advocacy of a league of democracies must, 
therefore, be understood as being inherently antagonistic, in that the case is presented 
from a platform of universal morality and yet is necessarily premised upon 
exclusivity.  Invoking fundamental values as the basis for security agreements, 
expresses a sense of superiority and an at least implicit – and in many cases, as shown 
above, explicit – desire to change those states that do not currently share the values in 
question.  The discourse established in these agreements, as well as in ‘league of 
democracies’ thought more broadly, is necessarily exclusive of non-liberal democratic 
states until such time as they become liberal democratic.  While this may sound like a 
desirable principle, in practice it engenders antagonism and division that may work 
against both short-term security interests as well as longer term political change in 
authoritarian states. In this case, China represents the ‘constitutive outsider’ par 
excellence and it should come as little surprise that the repeated references to ‘shared 
values’ were a source of upset for the Chinese administration and have been a 
hindrance to the realisation of a broader security community in the Asia-Pacific 
region.   
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References to shared values are, moreover, central to the identity formation of 
the states involved as well as being a major element of their claim to authority in 
international dealings.  Of particular interest in this regard is the claim by John 
Howard and Alexander Downer that security talks with Japan should not be regarded 
with suspicion because they are ‘natural.’73  In a similar vein, Daalder and Lindsay 
suggest that ‘working with fellow democracies is our native language.’74  The use of 
such phrases, while perhaps intended to assuage concerns in non-democratic states, 
generates the implicit idea that dealings between democracies and non-democracies 
are in some way unnatural.  This assumption is reinforced by references to ‘values 
gaps’75 and the explicitly preferential treatment for countries that ‘follow the path of 
democratic and responsible behaviour’76, all of which are underpinned by Daalder and 
Lindsay’s contention, drawn from the large but contentious body of democratic peace 
literature, that ‘relations between democracies and non-democracies are invariably 
infused with suspicion and mistrust.’77  
Democratic states are, from this perspective, not only more peaceful and 
trustworthy than non-democracies, they are also the only truly legitimate states within 
the international arena.  On this point, Daalder and Lindsay suggest that ‘real’ state 
legitimacy ‘must rest in the democratically chosen representatives of the people, not 
in the personal whims of autocrats or oligarchs.’78  At the international level, this 
translates as conferring legitimacy on those actions that meet certain ‘normative’ 
standards, rather than ‘the number of states or votes one can marshal in support of a 
given action.’79  This apparent disjunction in democratic practice, which supports 
elected representation at domestic level but denies the validity of democratic practice 
at international (United Nations) level is made possible through an understanding of 
states not as analogues of free individuals in a state of nature, but as guardians of a 
particular piece of ‘common humanity’.  In this regard, once again, we can see how 
universal values impact upon questions of power and legitimacy, establishing a 
distinction and a hierarchy between those states that adhere to the innate values of 
humanity and those that do not. 
Such criticisms of a liberal values-based security community take on an even 
greater significance when it is recognised that their main purpose is to expedite the 
use of force by the countries involved.  All of the security pacts discussed above relate 
in some way to enhanced military cooperation, whether that be through the joint 
development of anti-ballistic missile systems, greater interoperability of military 
forces, or greater access to military technology amongst the party states.  In the 
theoretical work on the Concert of Democracies, we can also see the use of force as 
the primary driver, as the aim of such a concert is to ‘free up’ those states that want to 
breach the sovereignty of other states (for the protection or promotion of universal 
human rights and democratic politics) from the constricting authoritarian vetoes on 
the UN Security Council.  Intensifying the sense of division between the world of 
authoritarian states and the Concert of Democracies is the notion that the former are 
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inherently conflictual, while the latter share in an assured peace.  The first article of 
the proposed Charter for a Concert of Democracies in the PPNS report formalises this 
liberal peace in the form of a legal obligation.80  Yet this peace is promised only 
among the democratic states, a declaration that carries with it the implication that war 
is sometimes acceptable – even necessary – against outsiders.  Movements toward 
military interoperability amongst democratic states, in combination with this implied 
tension with and mistrust of outsiders,  must again be seen as at best problematic and 
at worst provocative. 
The danger of these discourses is that may represent the precondition, to 
borrow from Hans Morgenthau, for ‘that moral excess and political folly’ that can 
lead to ‘the blindness of crusading frenzy’ that ‘destroys nations and civilizations.’81  
Concerns over the imperialistic use of liberal-democratic justifications for the use of 
force can also be seen in the work of Beate Jahn82 and in Tony Smith’s analysis of the 
collision between neo-conservative and neo-liberal thought in the context of 
contemporary US foreign policy.83  So while there may well be compelling rationales 
for the promotion of liberal democratic ideals on a global scale, the suspicion remains 
that the use of force for these purposes will prove damaging to that cause and, in a 
broader sense, will prove contrary to the very principles that are supposedly being 
promoted.  It is for these reasons that states should be very hesitant in their use of 
‘shared values’ as a foundation for the development of joint security measures.  As I 
will argue in the following section, it appears that this lesson may indeed have been 
learned (at least for the time being) and that the bonds that brought together the US, 
Japan, Australia and India, particularly between 2005 and 2008, are now being 
loosened in the interests of building stronger relations with China. 
 
 
Conclusion: Beyond ‘Shared Values’? 
 
Over the past two years, there has been a marked decline in the references to ‘shared 
values’ in the security relations between the US, Japan, Australia and India.  This may 
have been a result of a number of factors, including the ongoing difficulties in the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the global economic crisis and, perhaps most 
importantly, the changes in government in Australia, the US and Japan, all of which 
have contributed to the decline of an overtly values-based security architecture in the 
region.  I will first look to how the discourse has changed in recent times before 
briefly considering future directions in Asia-Pacific security that might avoid the 
‘hard edges’ of a liberal democratic security community.   
 The most obvious starting point in the charting the decline of liberal 
democratic values rhetoric is the departure of George W. Bush from office in the US.  
While Barack Obama has been equally enthusiastic about the role of the US in 
promoting democracy globally, it appears that the US is moving into a period of 
relative introspection and caution in foreign policy matters.  This is reflected in a 
report published by the 2008 Asia-Pacific Strategy Project entitled ‘The United States 
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and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration’.  In this 
report, under the sub-heading ‘Values-Based Architecture’, the authors show an 
awareness of the divisive nature of the Bush-era developments and argue that 
‘America’s first priority should not be to establish a ‘league of democracies’ in Asia, 
but to reset and rebalance our influence and strategic presence in the region, with 
good governance as a more mutually acceptable goal.’ Furthermore, the report argues 
that the new administration ‘should repackage its democracy promotion efforts’ in 
order to avoid antagonising China.84  In practical terms, the development of a US-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which held its first meeting in July this year, 
provides a further indication of a move away from a strategy based on shared values.  
Of particular interest is the agreement to ‘expand exchanges at all levels’ in ‘military-
to-military relations.’85 While this apparent retreat from the assertive and 
confrontational liberalism advocated by neo-conservatives and liberals alike is to be 
welcomed, it is notable that Hilary Clinton recently declared, in response to the 
equivocal  2009 Australian Defence White Paper, that ‘the United States is not ceding 
the Pacific to anyone. We are a trans-Pacific power as well as a transatlantic power.’   
 The Australian White Paper that provoked Clinton’s statement of US 
commitment to Pacific power provides further evidence of the slide away from the 
alliance of ‘great democracies’ envisioned by John Howard in 2005.  Indeed, one of 
the first acts of the Rudd government was the clear renunciation of Australian 
participation in the emergent quadrilateral dialogue with the US, Japan and India – a 
move that was announced by the Australian Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, on his 
inaugural visit to Beijing in early 2008.86  Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the 2009 
White Paper is notable for the near absence of shared values as justification for its 
policy proposals, a dramatic change from the 2000 Defence White Paper and the 2003 
Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper.  While some commentators have suggested 
that the new White Paper signifies a suspicion toward China’s future role in the 
region,87 it is clear that the Rudd government is placing far greater emphasis on 
security and economic cooperation with China than the Howard government and feels 
that excessive reference to shared values may be a hindrance to further developments 
along this path. 
 Finally, the political upheaval in Japan following the defeat of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) also looks likely to 
produce a diminution in the significance of a values-based alliance from the Japanese 
perspective.  While the foreign policy intentions of the new Prime Minister, Yukio 
Hatoyama, remain somewhat unclear, the publication of his article ‘My Political 
Philosophy’88 gives an indication of future directions.  Invoking a concept of 
‘fraternity’ as central to his economic, social and foreign policy, Hatoyama argues 
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that Japan must ‘must steadfastly adhere to…principles of independence and 
coexistence not only in the context of personal relationships within Japanese society 
but also in the context of the relationships between Japan and other nations.’  Based 
on this general principle, Hatoyama argues in favour of greater independence from the 
US in economic and security matters as well as the formation of an East Asian 
Security Community that would not seek to exclude China.  Once again, the 
avoidance of Japanese dependence upon an exclusive, values-based security 
community appears to be at the heart of these developments and Hatoyama’s 
insistence upon the maintenance of a pacifist foreign policy, as required under the 
Japanese constitution, is likely to provoke the consternation of the neoconservatives 
and liberal internationalists who have been agitating for a more forceful role for the 
Japanese military in global affairs. 
 While these changes could certainly be characterised as a return to a more 
‘realist’ foreign policy approach on the part of the US, Australia and Japan, they may 
also be indicative of broader changes in global power.  Approaching these 
developments from the discourse theory perspective, it may be argued that the change 
in vocabulary we have witnessed over the past two years is a direct consequence of 
the weakening of US global hegemony, or at least of regional hegemony in the Asia-
Pacific.  This decline is signified by the increasing reluctance on the part of other 
regional powers to fall in line with the shared values and democracy promotion 
rhetoric that is so central to US policy in the region.  In seeking to manage and 
influence the future politics of China, the United States clearly still speaks as a hegemonic 
force in the Asia-Pacific region and, indeed, globally.  It still insists that other states can 
only be considered responsible and legitimate on its own terms.  This insistence, however, 
may be losing some of its force and appeal.  This being the case, the need for genuine, 
open and constructive dialogue with China over the future of regional and global security 
is stronger than ever.  To retreat into a more closed and antagonistic set of security 
arrangements based on shared values would be extremely problematic and unproductive 
in this context. 
This paper has charted the rise and fall of values discourse in Asia-Pacific 
security over the past decade and a half in relations between the US, Japan, Australia 
and India as well as in the work of neoliberal and neoconservative scholars who 
advocated in favour of a Concert of Democracies.  I have suggested that there are 
some intrinsic problems within that discourse that were generating an unnecessary 
degree of antagonism with an increasingly powerful China and argued that the decline 
of such rhetoric may be linked to a decline in US hegemony more broadly.  What the 
role of liberal powers can or should be in promoting their own values has not been 
subject to discussion.  Suffice it to say that if liberal democratic powers are indeed 
committed to the maintenance of international (or global) peace and security, they 
would be well advised to sever the overt links between their values and the exertion of 
their military power on non-liberal democratic states.  It is perhaps through the 
exercise of a more open and self-reflexive liberal international politics – democracy 
promotion through setting a good example rather than through the use of force – that 
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